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HURDLES TO THE COURT: THE
DOCTRINE OF STANDING UNDER
STATUTORY VIOLATIONS
PRIYA KHANGURA*
INTRODUCTION
The meaning of standing is something that divides legal scholars,
courts, and practitioners. Standing is defined as a “party’s right to
1
make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.” In
federal court, standing refers to satisfying the case or controversy
2
requirement under Article III, which grants a plaintiff the right to tell
his story in court. Determining whether a party has Article III
standing involves a three-step inquiry: first, the petitioner must
sufficiently allege an injury-in-fact; second, the injury alleged must be
fairly traceable to the defendant’s actions; and third, a favorable
ruling by the court must be able to sufficiently redress the plaintiff’s
3
alleged injury.
The three elements outlined above are the “minimum
4
constitutional requirement” for a court to hear a case. But over the
years, courts have expanded the standing inquiry to additional claims,
distinguished from the above elements by the name “prudential”
5
standing. Prudential standing developed “to limit the role of courts in
6
resolving public disputes.” For example, courts will not hear cases by
plaintiffs asserting a “generalized grievance” whereby the plaintiff’s
7
harm is shared “in substantially equal measure” by a class of citizens.
Further, even if a plaintiff meets the “case or controversy”

* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class 2017.
1. Standing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under . . . the Laws of the United States.”).
3. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000).
4. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
5. Id. at 501.
6. Id. at 500.
7. Id.
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requirement, he must “assert his own legal rights or interests” and
8
cannot assert his relief on the rights of third parties. Prudential
standing can be overridden, however, if a court finds “countervailing
circumstances” or if Congress grants “an express right of action to
9
persons who otherwise would be barred.” But even if Congress
expressly affords a right of action, “of course, Art. III’s requirement
10
remains.”
Standing forms the basis of justiciability. As such, every plaintiff
must have standing to bring suit in federal court. Courts, however,
have struggled over what constitutes an injury-in-fact, often
considered to be the central inquiry in determining a party’s standing.
11
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins concerns this inquiry by asking whether a
12
violation of a federal statute grants a plaintiff standing to sue. By
granting certiorari, the Court will resolve a circuit split on the
definition of injury for the purposes of standing, and could potentially
redefine standing by either opening the door to federal courts (if
resolving for Robins) or by limiting Congress’s ability to confer
standing on parties who suffer statutory violations (if resolving for
Spokeo).
This Commentary discusses the parties’ arguments and urges the
Court to settle the issue by finding that a violation of a federal statute
does grant a plaintiff standing. Congress’s actions in creating the
violation reflect a legislative intent that such a violation is an injuryin-fact that can harm a plaintiff and grant him the right to sue in
federal court. And because the plaintiff here alleged sufficient injury
based on the effects of the statutory violation of a procedural right, he
(as well as others similarly situated) has standing.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner Spokeo, Inc. operates a website where users can obtain
13
a variety of information about individuals. The website aggregates
publicly available information into a searchable database accessible to
its users and generates a report about an individual upon a search

8. Id.
9. Id. at 501.
10. Id.
11. No. 13-1339 (U.S. 2015).
12. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, No. 13-1339 (U.S. 2015).
13. Brief for Petitioners at 3, Spokeo, No. 13-1339 (U.S. 2015) [hereinafter Brief for
Petitioner].
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query. The report may include information about a person’s age,
occupation, education, ethnicity, property value, hobbies, phone
number, marital status, and names of family members, as well as an
14
image of his residence.
Respondent Thomas Robins’s report was available on Spokeo’s
15
website. According to Robins, the report contained inaccuracies that
affected his employability—it stated that he had a graduate degree,
was employed in a professional or technical field, had very strong
economic health, was in a high wealth level, was in his 50s, was
16
17
married, and had children. All of this information was false. Robins
claimed his employment prospects were negatively affected by this
18
false report and that his unemployment was partly Spokeo’s fault.
Not only did he lose money from being unemployed, but Robins also
suffered “anxiety, stress, concern, and/or worry about his diminished
19
employment prospects.”
Robins brought suit against Spokeo, claiming Spokeo willfully
20
21
violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). He alleged that
Spokeo created and made available for purchase an inaccurate report
22
of his personal information. According to Robins, Spokeo was aware
of the inaccuracies in its processes, which compile reports based on
23
publically available information. Furthermore, Robins alleged that
Spokeo does not seek permission from individuals before publishing
24
this information. He sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and
25
statutory damages from Spokeo.
Spokeo maintains that its website warns users that “none of the
information offered by Spokeo is to be considered for purposes of
determining any entity or person’s eligibility for credit, insurance,

14. Brief for Respondent at 7, Spokeo, No. 13-1339 (U.S. 2015) [hereinafter Brief for
Respondent].
15. Id. at 9.
16. Id. at 8.
17. Id.
18. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 411 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1892
(Apr. 27, 2015) (No. 13-1339).
19. Id.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
21. Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 8.
22. Id. at 9.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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employment, or for any other purposes covered under FCRA.”
Before accessing the “Wealth” section of the website—which rates an
individual’s wealth on a scale from low to high and could include
information regarding an individual’s employment background, credit
27
history, mortgage value, and investments —users had to agree to this
28
Robins, however, alleges that Spokeo “markets its
disclaimer.
29
services to employers who want to evaluate prospective employees.”
Moreover, Robins points to “numerous investigative studies,” and a
statement by Spokeo’s founder to show that Spokeo’s reports often
30
contain inaccurate information.
The district court first dismissed Robins’s complaint for lack of
standing—specifically for insufficient injury—and granted him leave
31
to amend to address the issue of standing. Robins’s Amended
Complaint additionally alleged that Spokeo’s inaccurate consumer
reports caused him “actual and/or imminent harm by creating,
displaying, and marketing inaccurate consumer reporting information
32
about [him].” Spokeo responded by claiming it is not a consumer
33
reporting agency, and thus could not be sued under FCRA. Spokeo
then filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of
34
subject matter jurisdiction.
35
The district court initially denied Spokeo’s Motion to Dismiss for
claims arising under FCRA, finding that Robins had “alleged
36
sufficient facts to confer Article III standing.” Robins’s injury-in-fact
was “the marketing of inaccurate consumer reporting information,”
which “is fairly traceable to [Spokeo’s] conduct,” and “likely to be
37
redressed by a favorable decision.”
Furthermore, Robins’s
allegations that Spokeo “regularly accepts money in exchange for
reports that ‘contain data and evaluations regarding consumers’

26. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 13, at 4.
27. Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 7.
28. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 13, at 4; Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 7.
29. Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 7.
30. Id.
31. See Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., No. CV10-05306 ODW (AGRx), 2011 WL 1793334, at *1
(C.D. Cal. May 11, 2011).
32. Id.
33. Robins, 2011 WL 1793334, at *1.
34. Id.
35. The district court also granted in part Spokeo’s motion to dismiss on other claims not
relevant here.
36. Id. at 2.
37. Id.
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economic wealth and creditworthiness’” sufficed to “support a
plausible inference that [Spokeo’s] conduct falls within the scope of
38
the FCRA.”
Subsequently, Spokeo sought certification of an interlocutory
39
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). After this action, the district court
issued another order that reconsidered its prior ruling by dismissing
40
Robins’s action. The court struck its previous standing discussion
and reinstated its initial Order that found Robins failed to establish
41
standing. This order found Robins’s alleged harm “speculative,
attenuated, and implausible.” Furthermore, the court found that a
“mere violation” of FCRA “does not confer Article III standing,
42
where no injury is properly pled.” Additionally, the court found
43
Robins failed to meet the traceability requirement. The district court
44
dismissed the case with prejudice.
After Robins appealed, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court’s decision by finding that Robins’s alleged FCRA violations met
45
Article III standing requirements. The court found that Congress
intended to create a statutory right by creating a private cause of
action in FCRA, and that the violation of a statutory right usually
46
suffices to meet the injury-in-fact element of standing. Because
Robins alleged that his statutory rights were injured, he had a
47
sufficiently concrete and particularized injury. The court found that
the other two elements of standing—causation and redressibility—
48
were met because statutory rights were at issue. Once injury-in-fact
is proven in the context of a statutory right, “causation and
49
redressibility will usually be satisfied.”
Spokeo then petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, which
50
was granted.

38. Id.
39. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 13, at 6.
40. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., No. CV10-05306 ODW (AGRx), 2011 WL 11562151, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2011).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 13, at 6.
45. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 414 (9th Cir. 2014).
46. Id. 412.
47. Id. at 413.
48. Id. at 414.
49. Id.
50. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (2015).
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Standing
Standing is an essential element of every federal case. Under
Article III, federal “judicial power” is limited to resolution of “Cases”
51
or “Controversies,” so every plaintiff must have standing to bring
52
suit in federal court. Standing is demonstrated by a three step
inquiry: first, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury-in-fact that is
concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent, not conjectural
or hypothetical; second, the injury must be fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant; and, third, it must be likely, not
merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
53
decision.
The standing “question” for a court is whether a plaintiff has
sufficiently alleged a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
54
to allow his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction. This justifies the
55
use of court resources and remedial powers for his case. Standing is a
version of judicial self-governance and separation of powers that
ensures courts remain within their constitutionally delegated duties,
56
not encroaching on decisions better left to other branches.
The source of a plaintiff’s claim is an important part of the
standing inquiry. For example, if a plaintiff claims injury under a
statute, courts often ask whether Congress intended for a plaintiff to
57
bring suit. In many cases, standing has been denied for third-party
plaintiffs who alleged statutory violations because courts found that
58
Congress only intended for those directly affected to bring suit.
However, courts have also recognized that Congress has the power to
grant an express right of action to third-party plaintiffs, as long as they
meet the irreducible constitutional minimum of alleging an injury-in59
fact.

51. U.S. CONST, art. III, § 2.
52. See Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“Standing principles delineate
the ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ that are of the justiciable sort referred to in Article III.”).
53. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. Inc., 528 U.S. 168, 180–81 (2000).
54. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 500.
58. Id. at 501.
59. Id.
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B. The Statute
60

This case arises under FCRA, which obligates consumer
reporting agencies to comply with specific statutory guidelines in
transmitting consumer information. The goal of FCRA was “to
prevent consumers from being unjustly damaged because of
inaccurate or arbitrary information,” and “to prevent an undue
invasion of the individual’s right of privacy in the collection and
61
distribution of credit information.”
Under FCRA, a “consumer reporting agency” is “any person
which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis,
regularly engages . . . in the practice of assembling or evaluating
consumer credit information or other information on consumers for
62
the purposes of furnishing consumer reports to third parties.” A
consumer report is “any written, oral, or other communication of any
information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s
credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general
reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living” generated to
63
establish the consumer’s eligibility for certain purposes, including
64
“employment purposes.” Among other requirements, consumer
reporting agencies must “follow reasonable procedures to assure
65
maximum possible accuracy of consumer reports.”
The statute distinguishes between two types of violations:
66
negligent and willful. For a negligent violation, consumer reporting
67
agencies must pay actual damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. For a
willful violation, the harmed consumer is given a choice: the greater of
actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure
between $100 and $1000 or statutory damages between $100 and
68
$1000 for a person obtaining a report under false pretenses. For
69
willful violations, consumers may also seek punitive damages.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
S. REP. NO. 91-517, at 1 (1969).
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f).
Id. § 1681a(d)(1).
Id. § 1681a(d)(1)(B).
Id. § 1681e(b).
See id. §§ 1681n–o.
Id. § 1681o(a).
Id. § 1681n(a)(1).
Id. § 1681n(a)(2).
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C. The Circuit Split
Circuits are currently divided on whether a statutory violation
grants a plaintiff standing to sue. The Ninth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits
agree that a statutory violation may grant standing, but the Second
and Fourth Circuits have ruled the other way. In this case, the Ninth
Circuit found that Robins’s claim under FCRA sufficed to establish
an injury-in-fact and granted him standing. Previously, the Sixth
Circuit found a plaintiff bringing a class action claim under FCRA
had standing based on an inaccurate consumer report generated by a
70
credit reporting agency. Likewise, the Eighth Circuit recently found
that customers had standing to bring a class action against a wholesale
71
retailer under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act.
On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit found that individuals
bringing a class action under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (“ERISA”) failed to meet the injury-in-fact requirement
72
to establish standing. Similarly, in an earlier ERISA case, the Second
Circuit found a plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the defendants’
73
action.
The Ninth Circuit followed the approach of the Sixth and Eighth
Circuits by finding that a statutory violation provided a basis for an
74
injury-in-fact to meet constitutional standing requirements.
III. HOLDING
A. Injury-in-Fact
The Ninth Circuit held Robins’s alleged injury sufficed to grant
75
him standing. This holding rested on two main considerations: the
76
statute’s text regarding the requirements to allege a violation and
77
the fact that Robins’s injuries were individual and concrete. In
reviewing circuit precedent, the court noted that “Congress’s creation
of a private cause of action to enforce a statutory provision implies
that Congress intended the enforceable provision to create a statutory

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Beaudry v. TeleCheck Servs., Inc., 559 F.3d 702, 705 (6th Cir. 2009).
Hammer v. Sam’s East, Inc., 754 F.3d 492, 498 (8th Cir. 2014).
David v. Alphin, 704 F.3d 327, 334 (4th Cir. 2013).
Kendall v. Emp. Ret. Plan of Avon Prod., 561 F.3d 112, 123 (2d Cir. 2009).
See infra Section III.
Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 414 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 412–13.
Id. at 413.
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78

right.” Furthermore, the court stated that “the violation of a
statutory right is usually a sufficient injury in fact to confer
79
standing.” Against this backdrop, the court examined FCRA’s text
80
defining when a statutory violation occurs. Because FCRA does not
require a showing of actual harm when a plaintiff sues for violations,
the court found that proof of actual damages was unnecessary in the
81
standing inquiry. The court was guided by the statutory text because
“the scope of the cause of action determines the scope of the implied
82
statutory right.” Thus, Robins’s claim fit FCRA’s requirements for
alleging a statutory violation, which the court found sufficed for an
83
injury-in-fact.
The court then addressed congressional standing inquiring as to
“whether violations of statutory rights created by the FCRA are
‘concrete, de facto injuries’ that Congress can . . . elevate” to the status
84
of legally cognizable injury. The court looked to the Sixth Circuit’s
85
analysis in Beaudry v. TeleCheck Services, Inc. as a guide, and found
that because Robins was among the injured and the statutory right at
issue protected against individual harm, Robins’s injury was concrete
86
and legally cognizable.
B. Causation and Redressability
The Ninth Circuit also found that Robins fulfilled the remaining
87
standing elements: causation and redressability. Looking at
precedent, the Ninth Circuit found that “[w]here statutory rights are
asserted, . . . [its] cases have described the standing inquiry as boiling
down to ‘essentially’ the injury-in-fact prong.” Because the injury
could be traced to the violation of a statutory right, such a violation of
88
a statutor right caused that injury. Furthermore, by providing
89
damages in the statute for the violation, redressability was fulfilled.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 412.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 412–13.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 413–14.
Id. (applying Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)).
559 F.3d 702, 705 (6th Cir. 2009).
Id.
Id. at 414.
Id.
Id.
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Thus, the last two elements of standing were easily met in the court’s
eyes.
IV. ARGUMENTS
A. Spokeo’s Arguments
Spokeo argues that Robins’s claim under FCRA is insufficient to
90
meet the injury-in-fact requirement of standing. Its argument is
three-fold: first, Congress may not “override” the minimum injury
requirement of Article III; second, the constitutional minimum
requires “actual or imminent concrete harm”; and third, Robins has
91
not shown a concrete harm. To show a concrete harm under FCRA,
Robins would need to allege additional facts, such as suffering
92
additional pecuniary or other harm beyond the statutory violation.
Looking at precedent, Spokeo first argues that Congress may not
override the minimum Article III standing requirements of injury-in
fact, causation, and redressability because these are constitutionally
93
derived. But because prudential standing elements are judicially
created, they may be overridden if Congress creates a statutory right
94
that allows third parties to bring claims. And Spokeo argues that
Congress’s ability to override prudential standing stands “only for the
proposition that Congress ‘may elevat[e] to the status of legally
cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously
95
inadequate in law.’” Thus, Spokeo distinguishes between “injury in
fact” and “injury in law” to support its claim that Congress may only
create an “injury in law,” or legal right, which forms the foundation for
96
an injury-in-fact. Plaintiffs seeking justiciability, therefore, may use
the Congressionally created legal right to show an injury-in-fact under
Article III, but Congress cannot statutorily create or define an injury97
in-fact.
To support its limitation on Congress’s ability to define an injury98
in-fact, Spokeo then looks to the Constitution’s text and history.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Brief for Petitioners, supra note 13, at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14 (quoting Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 560, 578 (1992)).
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 18.
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Because the Framers drafted Article III to narrowly confine the scope
of judicial authority, properly applied, standing is only conferred on
“matters familiar to the Framers as disputes appropriate for
99
resolution in court,” deemed “legal wrongs.” All legal wrongs in the
English tradition “involved the infliction of concrete harm on a
100
person or property.” Spokeo looks to this history for the proposition
that such concrete harm “was a prerequisite” to bring a claim in
101
court.
Further, following separation-of-powers principles, Spokeo
asserts that only the judiciary can recognize an injury-in-fact once
private parties have demonstrated a concrete harm that exists beyond
102
a statutory violation. In other words, private individuals cannot
enter courts without alleging a concrete harm, even if they have
103
suffered a statutory violation. Without this limitation, Congress
104
would usurp the judiciary’s role.
Lastly, Spokeo proposes that Robins failed to allege a concrete
105
harm, even though FCRA was violated. This argument is four-fold.
First, because FCRA does not require proof of actual or imminent
concrete harm as an element of the legal violation, the Court cannot
106
rely on the statutory violation alone to grant Robins standing.
Second, FCRA’s right to recover damages does not meet the concrete
107
harm threshold. Third, FCRA’s legal violations are not grounded in
common law claims, such as defamation, to allow Congress to create
108
injury-in-fact here. Fourth, the publishing of inaccurate information
did not inflict concrete harm on Robins to meet the injury-in-fact
109
threshold based on the district court’s determination. For Robins’s
claim to proceed as it stands, FCRA would need to contain a clear
110
statement of intent “to abrogate the concrete harm requirement.”

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 20, 22.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 37–38.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 49–50.
Id. at 52–53.
Id. at 55.
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B. Robins’s Claims
Robins claims that the private right of action he commenced to
seek the statutory damages remedy that Congress provided in FCRA
111
meets Article III’s requirements. As Spokeo does, Robins cites
common law, Supreme Court precedent, and separation-of-powers
112
principles as support for his argument. According to Robins, the
113
injury requirement of Article III may exist solely from a statute.
This finds its roots in common law from the fourteenth century and
114
early Supreme Court decisions. Because Congress had historically
provided statutory damages to ensure that legal rights can be
remedied in court, allowing a statutory violation under FCRA to be
adjudicated in federal court follows Congress’s intent, according to
115
Robins.
Robins claimed that consequential harm has not been required to
116
establish standing. He cites early cases where courts recognized that
an invasion of a legal right sufficed to grant standing, without any
117
further showing of harm required. Even if a statute only grants an
injured party nominal damages, the injured party may still bring an
118
action in court to recover these damages. Further, Robins alleges
that Congress often grants statutory damages as a means to redress a
legal injury, and consequential harm was not necessary in each case
119
for statutory damages. Given this well-established tradition of
redressing invasions of legal rights, Robins claims that allowing his
120
action satisfies Article III.

111. Brief for Respondent, supra note 13, at 10.
112. Id. at 11.
113. Id. at 15–16.
114. Id. at 16–17. For example, Robins cites an early assault case in which the defendant
swung a hatchet at a woman but missed, with no physical harm caused. This “inchoate” violence
was redressable and conferred standing. Battery, trespass, and slander are also cited as examples
of cases of actions being maintained without requiring a showing of real-world damage or actual
harm.
115. Id. at 17.
116. Id. at 13.
117. Id. at 13–14.
118. Id. at 14.
119. Id. at 21–22. Here, Robins cites the Restatement (Second) of Torts for cases involving
property rights and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts for cases involving breach of
contract where “invasions of legal rights” are redressed by “nominal damages.” And Robins
cites a copyright case from 1790 where damages were granted absent consequential harm.
120. Id. at 13.
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V. ANALYSIS
The Court should find in favor of Robins. First, Robins’s claim
under FCRA is personal and particularized to establish concrete
harm. Second, separation-of-powers concerns are not implicated
when Congress grants a party the right to sue for a statutory violation.
And, unlike Spokeo’s claim, precedent favors granting Robins the
right to sue here because he meets the irreducible minimum of Article
III standing.
Robins’s claim meets the injury-in-fact requirement. As noted
121
above, an injury is “an invasion of a legally protected interest.”
Congress may define an injury by enacting a statute, which defines a
122
legally protected interest. Even when Congress defines an injury, a
plaintiff “must allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself, even if
123
it is an injury shared by a large class of other possible litigants.”
Thus, a plaintiff may first cite a statutory violation, but then must also
show how that violation affected him personally in order to meet the
injury-in-fact requirement. For example, the Court has found that if
Congress has designated an act as permissive under a statute and a
plaintiff can show a denial of access, the plaintiff suffers an injury-infact. In Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice, the Court
noted that the Federal Advisory Committee Act expressly allows
124
individuals to submit requests for information and agency records.
A denial of such a request “constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to
125
provide standing to sue.” The Court based this decision on previous
decisions evaluating requests under the Freedom of Information Act,
126
and found “no reason for a different rule” under a different statute.
Here, Robins fulfilled both prongs of this two-step injury analysis.
First, he claimed a violation of FCRA because inaccurate information
about him was posted on Spokeo. Alone, this injury would not be
enough—the mere presence of inaccurate information does not harm
someone. But the effects of the inaccurate information led Robins’s
claim to suffice as injury-in-fact. Robins suffered from the inaccurate
information because it negatively affected his employment prospects,

121. Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
122. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (quoting Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at
580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
123. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
124. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989).
125. Id.
126. See id. (listing cases).
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which necessarily constitutes a concrete, particularized injury under
FCRA. And Robins sought more than statutory damages for this
statutory violation—he also sought injunctive and declaratory relief.
Coupled together, his harm could be remedied—if the inaccurate
information about him was no longer on Spokeo, then his
employment prospects might change. Therefore, Robins’s injury
suffices as an injury-in-fact.
Second, separation-of-powers concerns are not implicated by
affording plaintiffs the ability to bring suit when Congress defines a
statutory violation. The core concern with the standing doctrine, as
noted above, is to prevent courts from overstepping their bounds into
areas distinctly reserved to other branches of government. But when
Congress directly expresses its intent for the judiciary to play a role in
resolving statutory violations, the concern about judicial overreaching
no longer exists. By enacting FCRA with specific provisions defining
statutory violations—including assigning punitive damages, which
courts can uniquely assess and demand—Congress empowered the
judiciary to step into this sphere. When Congress intends to preclude
127
judicial review, this is made clear in the statutory language.
However, FCRA does not prohibit judicial review. In fact, by keeping
the statutory damages provision unfixed and allowing punitive
damages to be assessed to statutory violators, it seems more likely
that Congress sought judicial review to determine how much damage
an individual plaintiff may be entitled to, depending on the nature of
the violation.
Furthermore, Congress has brought courts in to resolve such
disputes before, and it is not a stretch to think that it is acting similarly
now. For example, Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman addressed an
alleged violation under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) based on racial
128
steering practices. Because the Court recognized that “‘Congress
intended standing under Section 812 [of the FHA] to extend to the
full limits of Art. III,’” all the plaintiffs needed to show was an injury129
in-fact. It was clear that Congress intended parties to have the
ability to bring suit under the FHA, even though such a suit would not

127. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (“This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof,
except to the extent that—(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law.”).
128. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982).
129. Id.
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be possible without the statutory provision. In allowing the parties
to bring suit, the Court recognized that the statutory violation could
indeed meet the injury-in-fact requirement as long as the plaintiff
131
suffered a distinct and palpable injury. Therefore, allowing a court to
resolve injuries alleged under a statute does not implicate separationof-powers concerns because Congress, in defining statutory violations,
clearly intended for a court to resolve these violations.
Thus, Robins seems to have the better argument. By including a
statutory provision outlining a statutory violation, has allowed
aggrieved parties to challenge violators’ practices through the Act. To
resolve such an alleged violation, it is likely that a court battle will
ensue. The inquiry should focus on the extent of harm and the
potential restitution a court may grant an injured party. Even though
the minimal penalty may deter most individuals from filing suit, a
class action is the exact vehicle to channel such a suit if the violator
has caused large-scale harm. Without such actions, companies may
continue to violate FCRA, which implicates important privacy
concerns, by producing inaccurate data in an increasingly online
world. The doctrine of standing should not stand in the way of
meeting Congress’s goal to improve the quality of online data.
Because Robins was harmed by Spokeo’s act of making inaccurate
data about him readily available, he should be able to bring an action
in court to address these violations. The statute allows for it, and he
was personally injured. Therefore, the Supreme Court should affirm
the Ninth Circuit’s holding and find that Robins’s injury was sufficient
to establish standing.
CONCLUSION
Because Robins alleged a concrete, individualized injury caused
by Spokeo that can be adequately redressed in a court action, the
Supreme Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit’s ruling for Robins.
Such a finding is well in line with previous Court decisions finding
standing for plaintiffs who allege statutory violations, and is consistent
with fundamental principles outlining the accessibility of courts—
when an individual suffers an injury caused by the actions of another
party, the court acts as an open door to adjudicate such claims.
Finding for Robins simply affirms this basic principle without

130. Id.
131. Id.
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corrupting the doctrine of standing. Robins should be afforded his day
in court.

